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We examine the antecedents of professionalization in boards of firms affiliated to family
business groups, increasingly recognized in the literature as the dominant form of big
business organization in many late-industrializing countries. Dimensions of board
professionalization that we include in our study are board size, ratio of salaried
executives and outsider presence. We compare predictions on board composition derived
from contingency, institutional and power perspectives. Turkish family business groups,
considered as an archetypal example of this form of organization, provide the empirical
setting for the study, with data on 299 firms affiliated to ten different family business
groups. Our results provide greater support for institutional and power perspectives,
showing that, relative to internal and external complexity facing affiliate firms,
institutional pressures and the presence of joint venture partners better predict board
professionalization.
There has been a growing recognition lately of
the significance of the business group as a generic
organizational form (e.g. Granovetter, 2005).
Interest in business groups emerged as attention
turned to economic organization in East Asia
(e.g. Whitley, 1990). With expanding research, it
became increasingly clear that this particular
form of big business organization dominated the
economies of a broad range of late-industrializing
countries (Kock and Guille´n, 2001; Young et al.,
2008). Defined as a collection of ‘legally indepen-
dent firms, operating in multiple (often unrelated)
industries, which are bound together by persis-
tent formal (e.g. equity) and informal (e.g.
family) ties’ (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007, p. 331),
business groups were also shown to differ with
respect to ownership, authority structure, diver-
sification and size. A particular variant that has
attracted considerable attention has been the
family-controlled, centrally directed, diversified
and often large business group prevalent in many
late-industrializing economies. Families have sig-
nificant stakes in these groups, often exceeding
50% of the equity, and actively take part in their
governance and management, although outside
investors and foreign or local partners may also
be involved typically at the affiliate firm level
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Young et al., 2008).
The coexistence of family-based concentrated
ownership, unrelated diversification through leg-
ally separate firms and central coordination and
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control set family business groups (FBGs) apart
from the multi-divisional form, the conglomerate
and the stand-alone family business as well as
laterally linked networks of firms (Guille´n, 2000;
Whitley, 1999; Young et al., 2008).
Much of the research interest in FBGs has been
motivated by concerns with their emergence,
evolution and sustenance in particular national
contexts and the performance of affiliate firms
relative to independent companies (e.g. Chang,
2003; Guille´n, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).
Apart from general characterizations often con-
fined to the South Korean chaebol (e.g. Whitley,
1999), little empirical research exists on the ways
firms affiliated to FBGs are governed. This is
particularly notable at a time when many of the so-
called ‘emerging economies’ where business groups
of one kind or another are dominant have been
moving towards a more marketized and open
economy (Hoskisson et al., 2000), coupled with
initiatives for reforming corporate governance
(Tsui-Auch and Lee, 2003; Young et al., 2008).
Our study addresses this gap by focusing on
the boards of FBG-affiliated firms. Although
some direct or indirect ownership by a control-
ling family constitutes the basis of the link to an
FBG, as separate legal entities, affiliate firms have
their own shareholders and boards of directors
(Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Some of these firms
may be entirely controlled by the family, whereas
others may be publicly listed or include other
foreign or local companies as joint venture
partners. In formal terms, the boards are gover-
nance bodies with legal accountability and res-
ponsibilities to their respective shareholders. Yet
at the same time, affiliate firms are located in
an overarching group structure, which is led by
the founder or a later generation family member
together with a central administrative body
(Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Tsui-Auch and Lee,
2003; Yiu et al., 2007). Some of the earlier studies
on FBGs have therefore portrayed affiliate firm
boards as typically small, inactive and dominated
by members of owner families (e.g. Bug˘ra, 1994;
Chang, 2003; Young et al., 2008). The controlling
family has both the interest and often the power
to monitor affiliate firms, including those in
which external owners or partners may be
involved (Lane et al., 2006). Moreover, the desire
to retain control has to do with preserving the
power to exercise authority and shape strategy in
one’s own businesses (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin and
Schulze, 2004). Nevertheless, variably across
affiliate firms, boards may need or ought to be
formed in ways that extend beyond family
directors and, perhaps, a few close associates.
Indeed, at a more general level, FBGs in late-
industrializing countries have also been charac-
terized as a form of big business organization
that blends a kinship framework with the
managerial enterprise (Kock and Guille´n, 2001).
Thus, the central research question guiding this
study is ‘when do boards of firms affiliated to
FBGs become more professionalized?’ Following
recent calls for taking a multi-theoretic approach
in studies of boards and governance (e.g. Daily,
Dalton and Cannela, 2003; Huse, 2000; Lynall,
Golden and Hillman, 2003) we address this
question by empirically comparing contingency,
institutional and power perspectives, which offer
distinct theoretical rationales with respect to the
antecedents of board composition.
By examining boards within the framework of
a form of big business organization typically
found in late-industrializing countries, the study
also responds to calls for research on corporate
governance that goes beyond US firms (e.g. Huse,
2000; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Studying FBGs
provides a contrast to the US-based literature on
large corporations that, after Chandler (1977),
has come to take the managerial enterprise for
granted. By examining big business organization
under family control, the study adds to the
debates around the transition to more professio-
nalized governance now largely confined to small
family businesses or the entrepreneurial ‘thresh-
old’ firm (cf. Fiegener et al., 2000; Gedajlovic,
Lubatkin and Schulze, 2004; Voordeckers, Gils
and den Heuvel, 2007; Zahra and Filatotchev,
2004). Moreover, the focus on antecedents pro-
vides an opportunity to contribute to the meagre
literature on the way boards come to be formed,
as opposed to the preoccupation with their
performance outcomes (see for example Corbetta
and Salvato, 2004; Gabrielsson, 2007; Huse, 2000;
Pearce and Zahra, 1992).
Turkish FBGs, considered as an archetypal
example of large and diversified FBGs (see for
example Guille´n, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin,
2001; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Yiu et al.,
2007), provided the setting for the empirical
investigation. As previous studies have indicated,
FBGs constitute most of the largest economic
units in this country (Bug˘ra, 1994; Go¨kSen and
U¨sdiken, 2001; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Yur-
toglu, 2000). Turkey also offers an opportune
setting for the study with the transitional context
that it exemplifies. Following a long period of
state-guided import-substituting industrializa-
tion, the country embarked in the early 1980s
on a process of liberalizing and opening up its
economy (cf. Young et al., 2008). This was
accompanied by major institutional reforms
including the introduction of a corporate govern-
ance code in 2003 very much along the lines
promulgated by the OECD (Jesover and Kirkpa-
trick, 2005; Ugur and Ararat, 2006).
The next section of the paper provides an
overview of contingency, institutional and power
perspectives on the antecedents of board composi-
tion. We then put forth the hypotheses we derive
from each of these perspectives on the professio-
nalization of boards in firms affiliated to FBGs.
Description of the empirical methods, presentation
of results and a concluding discussion follow.
Antecedents of board composition:
contingency, institutional and power
perspectives
With a primary focus on large public corpora-
tions in the USA, mainstream research on boards
has been largely informed by agency theory.
There have also been calls, however, for taking a
multi-theoretic approach that complements or
extends beyond agency theoretic explanations,
given the variety of roles that boards perform
and the multiplicity of factors that may influence
their composition (Daily, Dalton and Cannela,
2003; Lynall, Golden and Hillman, 2003; Peng,
2004; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Family business
research has been particularly wary of the
possibility that considerations and recommenda-
tions relevant for large public corporations may
be inappropriate for family-owned small and
medium-sized firms (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004;
Lane et al., 2006). This has had to do mainly
with the primary emphasis on the resource role of
boards in such firms, coupled with the premise
that the ability to monitor firm actions may
thereby be enhanced. Similar concerns have been
shared by researchers of larger businesses under
concentrated family ownership in emerging eco-
nomies, notably in view of the limited empirical
support that agency theory has garnered in such
settings (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Peng, 2004;
Peng, Buck and Filatotchev, 2003).
Driven by such concerns, various studies in the
corporate governance literature (e.g. Finkelstein
and Hambrick, 1996; Pearce and Zahra, 1992)
and, particularly, the family business literature
(e.g. Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Gabrielsson,
2007; Huse, 2000; Voordeckers, Gils and den
Heuvel, 2007) have proposed a contingency pers-
pective for examining the antecedents of board
composition. In doing so, they have invoked a
variety of theoretical ideas in accounting for
variations in the way boards come to be formed.
These have included agency theory (e.g. Corbetta
and Salvato, 2004; Gabrielsson, 2007), resource
dependence (e.g. Gabrielsson, 2007; Pearce and
Zahra, 1992), structural contingency (Pearce and
Zahra, 1992), organizational lifecycle (e.g. Fie-
gener et al., 2000) and family-based (e.g. Corbet-
ta and Salvato, 2004; Voordeckers, Gils and den
Heuvel, 2007) arguments. Although variant in
their theoretical reasoning and the antecedents
that they consider, uniting these studies are two
core ideas. First, boards are viewed as functional
entities (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin and Schulze,
2004). Thus, the ways in which they are
composed is likely to have performance
consequences. Based on this techno-economic
rationale and as is typical of contingency
perspectives (Pennings, 1992), the second major
claim has been that board configurations should
be expected to vary with organizational char-
acteristics and the environmental conditions in
which firms operate (Pearce and Zahra, 1992).
Firm properties and the operating conditions
they face generate varying demands for their
management as well as governance (Fiegener
et al., 2000; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Thus,
like other structural arrangements, boards need
to be formed in ways that match situational
requirements. Aligning their composition with
situational demands promises greater competitive
advantage and superior performance, whilst not
doing so could be survival threatening (Carney,
1998; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). In brief,
according to the contingency perspective, firms
form their boards in ways that will make them
perform better.
Some of the mainstream literature on corpo-
rate governance (e.g. Lynall, Golden and Hill-
man, 2003) and, more so, research extending to
emerging economies (e.g. Douma, George and
Kabir, 2006; Peng, 2004) has suggested that
performance considerations may not be the only
factor at play in shaping board composition.
These studies have recognized that the way boards
are formed may be influenced by the social and the
regulatory conditions surrounding firms, especially
in late-industrializing countries which have recently
been undergoing policy and institutional changes
for liberalizing and internationalizing their econo-
mies (Young et al., 2008). An institutional pers-
pective has therefore been brought in as a
complement and, possibly, as an alternative to
the efficiency-based, functionalist theoretical ratio-
nale underpinning the contingency perspective.
From an institutional perspective, boards are
entities that are shaped by firms’ quest for legiti-
macy by conforming to external formal or non-
formal expectations (Lynall, Golden and Hillman,
2003). Such institutional pressures may take the
form of legal requirements, normative demands or
widespread adoption of particular governance
practices (Peng, 2004). Thus, board composition
becomes a response not to functional needs but to
these regulatory and social influences. An institu-
tional perspective would also imply, however, that
conformity to institutional prescriptions could be
more in appearance and entail ways that are not
discordant with underlying ideologies (Davis and
Marquis, 2005; Young et al., 2008).
Both earlier (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and
more recent (e.g. Daily, Dalton and Cannela,
2003) corporate governance literature has also
recognized that board composition involves
issues of power, though with an interest confined
to power relations between the board and the
CEO. This has implied a power perspective that
considers the conflicts of interest and power
differentials between boards and company execu-
tives (Daily, Dalton and Cannela, 2003). In an
extension of the power perspective, research on
small firms and family businesses has gone be-
yond this limited concern to consider the involve-
ment of other owners with significant stakes,
recognizing that this may serve to alter the
dominant coalition within the firm (Chua, Chris-
man and Sharma, 1999; Fiegener et al., 2000).
The board in these conceptions becomes a
representational entity, the composition of which
is negotiated on the basis of the relative power of
the parties that have a significant ownership
stake. This is likely to be particularly the case
when these other owners are not external parties
only with financial interests in the firm but are
involved as joint venture partners (Kumar and
Seth, 1998). Such partners will have a strong
motivation to partake in governance not only for
monitoring management and the other powerful
parties but also for aligning the strategies of the
joint venture with their own objectives. The
board is then likely to become a body primarily
for strategizing and for monitoring strategy
implementation (Kumar and Seth, 1998). It is
where the dominant coalition is represented and is
therefore likely to be shaped by the relative powers
of the parties in the coalition, based on their
ownership stakes and the knowledge or relational
resources that they bring to the venture.
Professionalization in boards of firms
affiliated to FBGs
The corporate governance literature on large
public corporations has typically treated board
size and the ratio of outside directors as the most
salient aspects of board composition (e.g. Dalton
et al., 1999; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). As recog-
nized in some of the literature on small and
medium-sized family businesses, however (e.g.
Chua, Chrisman and Sharma, 1999; Fiegener
et al., 2000; Voordeckers, Gils and den Heuvel,
2007), the primary concern confronting these firms
is professionalization, which relates to sharing with
or relinquishing authority and control to those
from outside the family. Board professionalization
is a central issue for large and diversified FBGs in
late-industrializing countries too, as it entails
a major transformation in their governance (cf.
Gedajlovic, Lubatkin and Schulze, 2004). In
addition, FBGs are different from stand-alone
family businesses in that they are composed of a
multitude of firms, which places greater strain on
the capacities of the controlling family to take part
in the boards of affiliates.
In operational terms, board professionalization
in FBG-affiliated firms may be assessed through
three separate dimensions, namely board size, the
ratio of salaried executives and the presence of
outside directors. For family-controlled firms in
particular, larger board size has been considered
as an indicator of more active and influential
boards, as opposed to the image of small, family-
dominated and thus passive bodies (Corbetta
and Salvato, 2004; Gabrielsson, 2007; cf. Dalton
et al., 1999). The extent to which salaried
executives are appointed to directorship positions
also shows how much the board moves away
from being a family board (Voordeckers, Gils
and den Heuvel, 2007). Differently from stand-
alone family firms, however, salaried executives
in boards of FBG-affiliated firms may come not
only from inside the respective firms but, possibly
more so, from the central administrative body at
the group level or from other group-affiliated
firms (Go¨kSen and U¨sdiken, 2001). The latter two
categories of executives, therefore, are not strictly
speaking insiders as they are not managers of the
particular affiliate firm. They are not exactly
outsiders either due to the executive positions
they hold within the group. Thus, another dimen-
sion of professionalization is the presence of
outside directors, which can be further divided, as
in the corporate governance literature, into
affiliated and non-affiliated outsiders (Lynall,
Golden and Hillman, 2003; Pearce and Zahra,
1992). Affiliated outside directors are those with
some kind of an extant or potential business link
with the firm (or, in the particular case of FBGs,
the group) while non-affiliated outsiders are those
whose only tie is their director role in one of the
affiliate firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Ema-
nating from agency theory, this division is
deemed important because the former are re-
garded as being constrained in performing their
monitoring function over managers of the firm or
the families which may be holding a significant
portion of equity (Anderson and Reeb, 2004;
Lynall, Golden and Hillman, 2003).
Put broadly, a contingency perspective sug-
gests that professionalization of boards in family-
controlled firms is dependent upon the govern-
ance demands arising from the conditions in
which the firm operates (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin
and Schulze, 2004). Although, as indicated in the
preceding section, contingency perspectives have
drawn upon a variety of theoretical ideas, more
typically they have combined a structural con-
tingency-cum-resource dependency rationale
(Pennings, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) in
formulating how governance issues are likely to
vary across firms (e.g. Pearce and Zahra, 1992;
Voordeckers, Gils and den Heuvel, 2007). The
main theme in this approach has been that
complexity of operations and the environment
surrounding the firm, as well as the resource
acquisition problems that the latter may generate,
are likely to make the governance task more
demanding (Daily and Dalton, 1992; Gedajlovic,
Lubatkin and Schulze, 2004).
Internal complexity, in these studies, has been
typically associated with firm size (Fiegener et al.,
2000; Gabrielsson, 2007). Environmental com-
plexity, on the other hand, has been linked with
firm strategy and, particularly, with diversifica-
tion (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). As a form
of diversification, internationalization through
exporting to foreign markets or running sub-
sidiary operations abroad implies even greater
environmental complexity (Gabrielsson, 2007;
Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Operating in
foreign markets also entails confronting unfami-
liar environmental conditions, making access to
critical resources more problematic (Sanders and
Carpenter, 1998). This is especially likely to be
the case in those late-industrializing countries
where FBGs have expanded around a strong
domestic orientation (Yamak and U¨sdiken, 2006).
According to the contingency perspective, great-
er internal and environmental complexity and the
concomitant need to gain access to critical
resources, in turn, necessitate more professiona-
lized governance. This is because of the wider
range of capabilities, external contacts and more
sophisticated management and organizational sys-
tems needed in those conditions (Daily and
Dalton, 1992; Gedajlovic, Lubatkin and Schulze,
2004; Voordeckers, Gils and den Heuvel, 2007).
Boards need to be made larger, for example, as
they can then be a source of greater expertise and
diversity of viewpoints as well as external
contacts that firms may lack internally (Fiegener
et al., 2000; Gabrielsson, 2007). Indeed, the few
available studies on stand-alone family businesses
have reported a positive relationship between
firm size and the size of the board (e.g. Fiegener
et al., 2000). Likewise, Gabrielsson (2007) found
a similar relationship between export activity and
board size in a sample of small Swedish firms.
Firms facing greater complexity also need to
expand their management capabilities, which
rest, it has been argued, on the introduction of
more advanced managerial systems and more
specialized, formalized and decentralized struc-
tural arrangements (Carney, 1998; Gedajlovic,
Lubatkin and Schulze, 2004; Zahra and Fila-
totchev, 2004). The unwillingness typically asso-
ciated with founders or owner-family members
to install more formal routines and to share
decision-making powers may serve as a barrier to
the establishment of such systems and structures
(Gedajlovic, Lubatkin and Schulze, 2004). These
barriers may be overcome by moving towards
more professionalized governance. Not only are
salaried managers likely to be more receptive to
more sophisticated methods and structures, but
they will also be better equipped, because of their
technical managerial abilities and skills, to direct
the setting up and implementation of elaborate
organizational and managerial systems.
As the conditions facing firms become more
complex internally or externally, the greater will
also be the need to opt for board members from
outside the firm with required competencies and
external linkages (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Peng,
2004; Voordeckers, Gils and den Heuvel, 2007).
In the case of FBGs this will entail extending to
outside the group. These may be individuals with
some prior or existing ties to the FBG or with no
such relationships to the group at large. Both
types of outside directors may be included when,
given the context in which the affiliate firm is
operating, the resources and contacts that are
needed cannot be obtained from within the FBG.
Altogether these considerations suggest the
following contingency hypotheses.
H1: Affiliate firm size will be positively asso-
ciated with (a) board size, (b) the ratio of salaried
managers and (c) the presence of affiliated and
non-affiliated outside directors on the board.
H2: Affiliate firm internationalization will be
positively associated with (a) board size, (b) the
ratio of salaried managers and (c) the presence
of affiliated and non-affiliated outside directors
on the board.
From an institutional perspective, professiona-
lization in boards will occur not because families
controlling FBGs recognize the value of profes-
sionalizing governance in view of situational
demands facing affiliate firms, but rather when
they perceive themselves as being obligated to do
so (Tsui-Auch and Lee, 2003). Such outside
influences emanate from normative and regula-
tory frameworks around firms (Lynall, Golden
and Hillman, 2003). They are likely to be
particularly pertinent for businesses in late-indus-
trializing economies as currents enjoying acclaim
as ‘modern’ (or ‘good’) governance practices
spread worldwide (Peng, 2004). Embodied in these
normative claims is the belief that within the
present day global context strengthening profes-
sionalism will contribute to greater international
competitiveness of indigenous firms (see for
example Ugur and Ararat, 2006). More influential
in these contexts, however, are likely to be the
pressures from national authorities, as they take on
the role of promulgating these international
‘standards’ locally (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005).
Such regulatory influences may be one of two
kinds with possible effects on particular types of
FBG-affiliated firms. One of these relates to
publicly listed firms, which have been the primary
target in national level endeavours towards
governance reform. Based very much upon ideas
derived from agency theoretic premises (Luo and
Chung, 2005; Peng, 2004), regulatory frame-
works related to these firms aim to promote
boards that are more active and influential as
governance bodies. The central concern is to urge
the adoption of mechanisms that will purportedly
enable better monitoring of managers and, even
more so, the controlling families (Young et al.,
2008). A key element in this respect has been to
push for the placement of ‘non-executive’ and
‘independent’ directors on boards by offering
specific guidelines with regard to their ‘proper’
proportions, though these provisions may be, as
in the Turkish case, in the form of softer ‘comply
or explain’ requirements (Jesover and Kirkpa-
trick, 2005; Peng, 2004; Ugur and Ararat, 2006).
The second type of institutional pressure
mediated by the state and its agencies can be
sector-specific, involving stricter legal require-
ments with respect to governance, because of a
greater concern with closer regulation of parti-
cular sectors (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). In
Turkey, for example, separate laws exist for
banking and insurance, which also include
stipulations that relate to the governance of firms
operating in these sectors such as the number of
board members and their educational and profes-
sional backgrounds (Ugur and Ararat, 2006).
From an institutional perspective, it is these
kinds of pressures that will drive FBG-affiliated
firms towards greater professionalization in their
boards. This will be mainly due to the concern
with gaining and maintaining legitimacy vis-a`-vis
public authorities by conforming to their norma-
tive and regulatory requirements (Tsui-Auch and
Lee, 2003). Boards, for one, are likely to be larger
because board size is a highly visible feature and
larger size signals a more active and independent
board. Likewise, they should be expected to a
have a higher ratio of salaried executives and to
include outside directors.
However, the institutional perspective also
suggests that, when the underlying motive is
conformity to external pressure, adoption of
governance structures may take forms more in
line with owner families’ tendencies to retain
control rather than the intentions carried in
normative and regulative prescriptions (Peng,
2004). So, under pressure to make boards more
professionalized, families controlling FBGs are
likely to turn first not to outsiders but to their
closest professional associates. These will prob-
ably be salaried executives from within the group
with whom the family has had long-standing ties.
Sharing authority even with those executives is
not an easy transition for controlling families.
Nevertheless, it may be facilitated to some degree
by trust relationships that can develop often with
a smaller group of managers as a result of long
years of service and loyalty to the FBG (Luo and
Chung, 2005). Including complete outsiders into
governance structures is a much more difficult
step. Therefore, if external pressures call for
outsider presence, these will probably be affiliated
outside directors (Filatotchev, Lien and Piesse,
2005; Tsui-Auch and Lee, 2003). Selection of
directors in these ways is possible even in publicly
listed firms as small shareholders are likely to
have little influence vis-a`-vis the controlling
family over decisions as to who will be offered
seats on the board (Tsui-Auch and Lee, 2003;
Yurtoglu, 2000). In emerging country contexts
institutional investors are not likely to have much
weight either. Domestic ones without links to
FBGs are few and the foreign ones often tend to
show little interest in obtaining board representa-
tion, as their involvement is primarily of a
financial nature (Douma, George and Kabir,
2006; Yurtoglu, 2000).
These considerations suggest the following
hypotheses.
H3: Affiliate firms that are publicly listed are
more likely to have (a) larger boards and (b)
a higher ratio of salaried executives and
affiliated outside directors and (c) less likely
to have non-affiliated outside directors on the
board.
H4: Affiliate firms in closely regulated sectors are
more likely to have (a) larger boards and (b) a
higher ratio of salaried executives and affiliated
outside directors and (c) less likely to have non-
affiliated outside directors on the board.
Within the context of firms within FBGs, as
well as in other family firms (Fiegener et al.,
2000), power issues in governance emerge more
explicitly when engagement with external capital
takes the form of partnership with a foreign or a
domestic corporation (Yurtoglu, 2000). Involve-
ment of such partners needs to be distinguished
from shareholding by financial institutional
investors, as the former will have strategic
interests in such joint ventures (Douma, George
and Kabir, 2006; Yan and Gray, 2001). Given the
weak institutional environments that often char-
acterize late-industrializing countries, the most
important way available to external partners for
monitoring firm management as well as the
family controlling the business group could be
to have seats on the board of the joint venture
(Chang, 2003). Moreover, the strategy-making
role of the board will probably be enhanced as
the strategies of the partnership will need to be
coordinated with respect to the aims of all the
major parties involved, be they, in addition to the
FBG, a foreign or a domestic parent (Kumar and
Seth, 1998; Yan and Gray, 2001). These con-
siderations point to a board that will need to be
made larger and more active relative to those of
affiliate firms in which the controlling family
remains as the single large owner.
Engagement in a joint venture will also shape the
ways in which the directorship positions other than
those allocated to the external partner are filled.
One likely outcome is a lower ratio of salaried
managers from the FBG side. The rationale for this
prediction is twofold. First, within the tripartite
relationship in these joint ventures involving the
controlling family, the external partner and salaried
management within the FBG, the professional
managers are the least powerful. Their chances of
getting board seats are likely to be undermined
therefore when the two more powerful parties
confront one another and negotiate allocation of
directorships (Yan and Gray, 2001). Second, for
FBGs, entry into joint ventures with another
foreign or domestic company is not likely to be
motivated solely by concerns for financing but also
by benefits to be obtained from the business and
managerial competencies of the partner (Douma,
George and Kabir, 2006). The directors that the
latter will be providing may be seen as expanding
the board’s resource and monitoring capacities,
thereby reducing the significance of the expertise
and contacts that salaried executives from within
the group may bring to the board.
Determining who will represent the FBG on
the boards of joint venture affiliates will largely
be at the discretion of the FBG itself, as it will be
for the partner company (Douma, George and
Kabir, 2006). Appointment of any outside
directors, on the other hand, will require joint
agreement. It is not likely that the other partner
to the venture will accept affiliated outsiders with
a close relationship to the family or the affiliate
firm, as it may imply shifting the power distribu-
tion within the board in favour of the FBG.
Neither would the partner see much benefit in
having non-affiliated outsiders especially as a
mechanism for monitoring the controlling family,
as this particular role can be more effectively
carried out by the partner’s own representatives.
Hence the following hypotheses are proposed.
H5: Affiliate firms that have a foreign or domestic
partner are more likely to have (a) larger boards
and (b) a lower ratio of salaried managers and (c)
less likely to have affiliated or non-affiliated
outside directors on the board (excluding direc-
tors representing external partners).
Data and methods
The research setting and the sample
FBGs in Turkey are identifiable through a
‘holding’ company that constitutes the apex of
the group and houses the central administration.
Although FBGs structured in this manner are
numerous, many resemble stand-alone family
businesses and are likely to have adopted the
‘holding’ label for normative and mimetic rea-
sons (Bug˘ra, 1994). Large and diversified ones,
on the other hand, approximating the generic
form, are not many (cf. Khanna and Rivkin
(2001) who could identify only nine business
groups in their Turkish sample). So, for inclusion
in the study, the FBG had to have affiliate firms
in five or more sectors (according to the two-digit
International Standard Industrial Classification),
a minimum of three listed firms, and at least one
firm in the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s listing
(in 2004) of the 500 largest companies in the
country. Altogether ten FBGs satisfied all the
three criteria. In all these FBGs, like the others in
the country, the person at the very top (the
chairperson of the ‘holding’ board) was a family
member, although the generation s/he came from
varied. In four cases the founder was still the
head of the group. Of the remaining, four were
headed by a second- and two by a third-
generation family member.
Only ‘main’ firms in each business group were
included in the study. Thus, firms that were a
subsidiary (within the country or abroad) of an
affiliate firm and those in which the family, the
holding company and other affiliate firms, alto-
gether, had less than 10% equity ownership were
excluded. So were the few firms that were not
incorporated as a socie´te´ anonyme, the legal form in
Turkey whereby firms are required to have a board
(of a minimum of three members for all businesses
other than banks and insurance companies for
which the minimum is five directors). This resulted
in a sample of 299 firms affiliated to the ten
business groups included in the study. The number
of firms per group varied between five and 60.
Affiliated firms in the sample operated in a wide
range of sectors including manufacturing, agro-
business, mining, construction, retailing, tourism,
telecommunications, financial services, insurance
and the media. As is typical of FBGs, there was
large variation in the size of affiliate firms, ranging
from less than ten employees to a workforce of
above 10,000, with a sample average of 655.4
employees. Although direct shareholding by family
members in affiliate firms was not high (around
9% on average; Table 1, later), through shares held
by the holding company and, to a lesser degree, by
other firms in the business group, the owner
families controlled, on average, 79% of the equity
of the affiliate firms in the sample. Only 18% of the
affiliates were publicly listed. In these firms, on
average, 28% of the shares were publicly held.
Exactly one-quarter of the firms had a foreign and
12% a domestic partner, which respectively owned,
on average, 43% and 34% of the equity in these
joint ventures.
Data collection
Data were obtained from a variety of sources.
The yearbook of the Istanbul Stock Exchange
was the main source of data on publicly listed
affiliate firms. For firms that were not listed, data
were obtained from the records held at the
chambers of commerce. Additional data came
from the yearly publication listing of the largest
1000 industrial companies in Turkey. When
available, annual reports and websites served as
supplementary data sources. Finally, for data
that could not be obtained from these public
sources the business groups were approached and
all agreed to take part in the study. All the data
collected pertain to the end of the year 2004.
Variables and measures
Dependent variables. Of the variables used to
gauge professionalization, board size was mea-
sured as the total number of directors. The ratio
of salaried executives was calculated by dividing
the total number of non-family managers on the
board (occupying an executive position within
the FBG) by board size. An executive position in
the group could be at the central administrative
body or any affiliate firm including the focal one.
Board members other than family directors,
salaried executives from within the business
group, and representatives of any joint venture
partners were considered as outsider directors.
An outside director was coded as an affiliated
outsider if s/he was a retired executive from the
group, had any prior or current business relation-
ship with the FBG or was a board member in
more than one affiliate firm. Non-affiliated out-
siders, on the other hand, had no prior employ-
ment relationship with the FBG and were a
board member only in the respective focal firm.
Coding to distinguish between these two types of
outsiders was based on biographical data and
done separately by the two authors. Discrepan-
cies which occurred in a very few of the cases
were resolved by discussion. As the number of
affiliated and non-affiliated outside directors was
often small in the boards that had them, we
assessed their presence rather than ratio in
the analyses (see Peng, Buck and Filatotchev,
2003).
Independent variables. Affiliate firm size was
measured by the number of employees. The
natural log of this measure was used in the
analyses to account for non-linear effects of size
(Kimberly, 1976). Two indicators were employed
for internationalization (Sullivan, 1994). One of
these measured the ratio of exports in the total
sales of the affiliate firm. The second aimed to
measure the extent of foreign operations by
identifying the number of countries in which the
affiliate firm had operating subsidiaries. As there
was little variation in this count among firms with
international involvement of this kind, the
measure was employed as a dummy variable that
distinguished between firms that had at least one
operational unit abroad and those that had no
foreign operations.
Of the two indicators for assessing the extent to
which affiliate firms were under institutional
prescriptions concerning their governance systems,
one was based on whether or not the firm was
publicly listed. The other distinguished, again with
a dummy variable, between financial and all other
sectors. The former represented a closely regulated
sector, as in Turkey banks and insurance compa-
nies are subject to separate laws and regulations as
well as the surveillance of a regulatory body (Ugur
and Ararat, 2006).
The presence of a foreign or domestic partner
was measured by separate dummy variables. The
threshold for treating an external party as a major
partner was set at 10%, a level deemed appropriate
given the scale of direct and indirect family
ownership in FBG-affiliated firms in Turkey
(Yurtoglu, 2000).
Control variables. The direct ownership stake
of the members of the controlling family (or
families) in the affiliate firm and the firm’s age
were included in the analyses as control variables.
Family share was operationalized as the propor-
tion of equity held directly by family members.
Firm age was computed from the year the affiliate
firm was established or, in a few cases, acquired
by the FBG. Earlier literature suggests that these
two variables may be related to the readiness of
owner families to share governance roles with
salaried managers or outsiders. Higher proportion
of equity held by family members, for example, has
been associated with tendencies to avoid inter-
ference at the board level (e.g. Fiegener et al.,
2000). Firm age, on the other hand, has been
identified as a source of inertia and linked with the
tendency to preserve established practices pertain-
ing to board composition (Peng, 2004).
Analyses
In testing the hypotheses, we used ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression for board size and the
ratio of salaried executives and logistic regression
for affiliated and non-affiliated outsider directors,
since the latter variables were operationalized by
dichotomous measures. Given that the firms in
the sample were affiliated to FBGs, clustering was
implied in the data. Indeed, analyses of variance
results showed significant differences among
business groups in board size, ratio of salaried
executives and affiliated outside directors. We
therefore employed a fixed effects model in both
types of analyses (Cohen et al., 2003). Dummy
variables were used for each of the FBGs. The
largest and the oldest FBG served as the base
group. For each dependent variable, we first ran
models that included the FBG dummy and the
control variables. We then estimated models that
added the independent variables of the study.
Descriptive analyses suggested no major corre-
lation problems among the independent vari-
ables. Neither did the multicollinearity checks in
the OLS regression models indicate any serious
problems, as the variance inflation factor did not
exceed 1.73 and the largest condition index was
12.85 (cf. Cohen et al., 2003).
Results
Descriptive statistics for independent, dependent
and control variables and bivariate correlations
are shown in Table 1. Notably, the average board
size in this sample was 5.70 (with a range from
three to 13 members of which, on average, one-
fifth were family members). As expected, the
average ratio of salaried executives (0.58) on
boards was much higher than the ratio of
affiliated (0.07; present in 34% of the firms) and
non-affiliated outside directors (0.02; present in
only 8% of the firms).
In Tables 2 and 3 we present the outputs of the
OLS and logistic regression analyses. Only a few
of the hypotheses based on the contingency
perspective received support. As predicted
(H1a), a significant positive relationship was
obtained between affiliate firm size and the size
of the board. However, neither of the two
measures of internationalization was associated
with board size (H2a). Predictions with respect to
the ratio of salaried executives were not sup-
ported either. In fact, the result obtained for
affiliate firm size was contrary to what was
expected (H1b). The ratio of salaried executives
was lower in larger affiliate firms. Internationa-
lization of affiliate firms was not associated with
this variable either (H2b). Hypotheses 1c and 2c
predicted, respectively, that firm size and inter-
nationalization will be positively associated with
the presence of both types of outside directors.
We found no empirical confirmation for these
predictions in relation to affiliated outsiders.
Support was obtained, however, for non-af-
filiated outsider presence. As predicted, firm size
was positively associated with the presence of the
latter type of outside directors. So was the foreign
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlationsa
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Board size 5.70 1.89
2. Ratio of salaried executives 0.58 0.28 0.19
3. Affiliated outsiders (yes5 1) 0.34 0.47 0.31  0.15
4. Non-affiliated outsiders (yes5 1) 0.08 0.27 0.22  0.09 0.09
5. Firm sizeb 5.07 1.76 0.34  0.23 0.17 0.23
6. Export ratio 0.13 0.24 0.01  0.11 0.05  0.01 0.27
7. Foreign operations (yes5 1) 0.11 0.31 0.18  0.10 0.11 0.30 0.36 0.06
8. Publicly listed (yes5 1) 0.18 0.39 0.38  0.17 0.25 0.22 0.46 0.16 0.33
9. Regulated sector (yes5 1) 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.21 0.13 0.11 0.07  0.22 0.01  0.02
10. Foreign partner (yes5 1) 0.25 0.43 0.25  0.29 0.15  0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00
11. Domestic partner (yes5 1) 0.12 0.33 0.08  0.13 0.03  0.03 0.04  0.01 0.03 0.04 0.16  0.10
12. Family share 0.09 0.21 0.08  0.13 0.03 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.05  0.05 0.07  0.13 0.09
13. Firm age 18.2 14.1 0.27  0.15 0.24 0.09 0.41 0.23 0.18 0.32 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.17
aCorrelation coefficients above 0.12 are significant at 0.05, and those above 0.15 at the 0.01 level.
bLogarithm. Average firm size is 655.43 with a standard deviation of 1484.03.
operations measure of internationalization. Af-
filiate firms that had operations in at least one
foreign country were more likely to have non-
affiliated outsiders on their boards. No significant
relationship was obtained, however, for the
export ratio measure of internationalization.
Hypotheses based on an institutional perspective,
on the other hand, received more support. As
expected (H3a), we found that affiliate firms that
were publicly listed had boards that were larger.
Likewise, the boards of firms operating in the
closely regulated finance sector were likely to be
larger relative to those in other sectors (H4a). We
also obtained support for the predicted positive
relationship between close regulation of a sector
and the ratio of salaried executives as well as the
presence of affiliated outsiders on boards (H4b).
Public listing, on the other hand, was not positively
associated with the ratio of salaried executives from
within the business group, though it was, as
predicted, related to the presence of at least one
affiliated outside director (H3b). Findings on
affiliated outside directors lend support to the
institutional view that, under pressure to conform
to institutional prescriptions, FBGs tend to allocate
board directorships to closer associates that for-
mally appear as outsiders. The predictions (H3c
and H4c) that FBG linked firms that are publicly
listed or operate in closely regulated sectors are also
less likely to have non-affiliated outside directors,
however, was not confirmed. As shown in Table 3,
no relationship was found between the institutional
contexts of firms and the presence of non-affiliated
outsider directors.
Most of the predictions based on the power
perspective were supported. As hypothesized
(H5a), joint venturing with other firms was
positively associated with board size irrespective
of whether the partner was foreign or domestic.
In both cases boards were likely to be larger than
those of other affiliate firms. Again as expected
(H5b), partnering with foreign or domestic firms
had negative effects on the extent to which
salaried managers from within the FBG obtained
seats on affiliate firm boards. It is also notable
that the negative relationship is stronger in cases
where foreign firms are involved in the joint
venture. Predictions regarding outsider presence
(H5c), however, were confirmed only in the case
of affiliated outsiders in foreign partnerships. As
hypothesized, when partnering was with a foreign
company, FBG linked firms were less likely to
have affiliated outsider directors on their boards.
The finding for non-affiliated outsiders was also
in the predicted direction but did not reach an
acceptable level of statistical significance. Never-
theless, the latter finding is a further indication
that joint ventures with foreign partners are not
particularly conducive to the inclusion of any
kind of outsiders from the local setting. Neither
Table 2. Results of fixed effects OLS regression analyses for
board size and the ratio of salaried executivesa,b
Variables Board size Ratio of salaried
executives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family share  0.10w  0.03  0.02  0.08w
Firm age 0.21*** 0.11*  0.16**  0.13*
Firm size 0.22***  0.12*
Export ratio  0.04 0.02
Foreign operations 0.05  0.01
Publicly listed 0.20***  0.07
Regulated sector 0.21*** 0.19***
Foreign partner 0.22***  0.42***
Domestic partner 0.15***  0.21***
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.48 0.17 0.40
Adjusted R2 change 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.23
F change 11.07*** 16.72*** 6.54*** 16.60***
aStandardized coefficients are reported; n5 299.
bAll analyses include nine dummy variables for the FBGs.
Results for these variables have been omitted.
wpo0.10; *po0.05; **po0.01; ***po0.001.
Table 3. Results of fixed effects logistic regression analyses for





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant  1.13**  1.76*  2.93***  4.92***
Family share  0.00  0.02 1.60w 1.74w
Firm age 0.04*** 0.03* 0.02  0.02
Firm size 0.15 0.42*
Export ratio 1.14 0.04
Foreign operations  0.27 1.58*
Publicly listed 0.95* 0.52
Regulated sector 1.53*** 0.84
Foreign partner  1.09**  1.03
Domestic partner  0.22  0.53
Chi-square 71.41*** 104.79*** 12.76 43.55**
Chi-square change 33.38*** 30.79***
aLogistic coefficients are reported; n5 299.
bAll analyses include nine dummy variables for the FBGs.
Results for these variables have been omitted.
wpo0.10; *po0.05; **po0.01; ***po0.001.
of the expected relationships was found, however,
for affiliate firms that had domestic companies as
their partners.
Of the two control variables, firm age emerged
as a more influential factor on the ways in which
boards were composed. Older firms had larger
boards in which affiliated outsider directors were
also likely to be present. On the other hand, firm
age was negatively associated with the ratio of
salaried managers on the board. A similar but
weaker relationship with the ratio of salaried
managers was also obtained for direct family
share in ownership. Interestingly, the latter
variable was also positively and strongly asso-
ciated with the presence of non-affiliated outside
directors on the board. This finding may be
indicative of the controlling family substituting
salaried managers with knowledgeable or well-
networked outsiders unrelated to the FBG when
they have higher direct stakes in affiliated firms.
Discussion
The theoretical implications that can be derived
from this study are fourfold. First, and foremost
perhaps, in the context of FBGs in a late-
industrializing country, our study provided greater
support for institutional and power perspectives
relative to a contingency perspective on board
composition. Whether boards were more or less
professionalized depended more on institutional
pressures and the presence of joint venture partners
than it did on organizational or environmental
complexity confronting affiliate firms. Contingency
effects were, for the most part, limited to the
presence of non-affiliated outside directors. That
the latter findings are partly in line with some of the
research on small stand-alone family businesses in
very different settings (e.g. Fiegener et al., 2000;
Gabrielsson, 2007) and, indeed, on large US
corporations (e.g. Pearce and Zahra, 1992) is
notable. Still, the results of this study are significant
in view of some of the recent claims that going
beyond efficiency-based perspectives is likely to
prove more useful in studying strategic, organiza-
tional and governance phenomena in transitional
late-industrializing countries (Hoskisson et al.,
2000; Peng, 2004).
Second, the weaker support obtained for the
contingency perspective also relates to the broad-
er issue of ‘modernizing’ the business enterprise
in countries where industrialization and, indeed,
marketization have been late coming (Tsui-Auch
and Lee, 2003). The central claim of the
contingency perspective is that organizational
and environmental conditions are likely to lead
firms to adopt more ‘modern’ board structures
due to perceived performance benefits. The
findings of this study have provided limited
empirical support to this argument and thus to
the alleged effects of efficiency concerns on the
professionalization of governance in FBGs. In-
deed, there is even some evidence contrary to
what would be expected based on a contingency
perspective. A negative relationship was ob-
served, for example, between firm size and the
ratio of salaried executives on boards. Coupled
with parallel results for firm age and family share
in ownership, it appears that controlling families
are still hesitant about including salaried man-
agers on boards of affiliate firms which may
matter most to them. A higher ratio of salaried
executives is more likely on the boards of firms
that are probably less significant within the FBG,
i.e. those which are smaller, younger and where
there is less direct ownership by family members.
Third, that organizational and environmental
exigencies were found to be influential only to
some degree may be indicative of the limited
impact that macro-level institutional and market
reforms in late-industrializing countries may be
having on the core features of their national
business systems. Views have diverged on the
pace and the extent to which liberalization and
internationalization attempts may be leading to
alterations in governance and management prac-
tices. For example, those adopting a comparative
business systems perspective (e.g. Whitley, 1999)
have argued that the impact of reforms on
enterprise change is likely to be slow and limited.
Others, on the other hand, have attributed
greater causal significance to macro-level altera-
tions in leading to changes in strategy and
structure (e.g. Hoskisson et al., 2000). Empirical
studies on the effects of the post-1980 Turkish
liberalization experience have also pointed to
ensuing strategy and management changes in
business firms (e.g. Yamak and U¨sdiken, 2006).
Together with the latter findings, the results of
this study may be pointing to a possible
reconciliation of the opposing views on the
impact of economic and institutional reform on
business enterprises. It may well be that govern-
ance systems are most resistant. On the other hand,
adaptation to the new conditions generated by
liberalization and internationalization may be
taking place more readily at the level of manage-
ment practices. Indeed, adopting more ‘modern’
management methods may actually be contribut-
ing to the sustenance of the FBG as the dominant
form of enterprise in late-industrializing countries.
Finally, and along similar lines, our results
show that the impact of internationalization in
‘emerging economies’ in the form of receiving
foreign direct investment does not lead to out-
comes that are indicative of convergence towards
some kind of a global standard. Internationaliza-
tion of financial markets and the entry of
multinational firms into these economies have
often been hailed as an impetus for the ‘moder-
nization’ of governance and management systems
(e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 2000). In support of
views that have been sceptical about such con-
vergent effects (e.g. Davis and Marquis, 2005), our
study suggests that these claims need to be received
with caution, at least in relation to governance and
within the context of the FBGs. Indeed, partnering
with foreign firms appears to be not very different
from having domestic partners. Our results do
show that in both cases boards become larger
(model 2 in Table 2) and that they include outsider
directors of the ‘owner’ or ‘owner-representative’
kind (not reported). In the case of partnering with
foreign firms, this possibly implies that there is
more professionalization of boards, though only
through the presence of foreign managers. Indeed,
this may have a role to play in increased adoption
of ‘modern’ management systems. It does not,
however, lead to ‘modernizing’ boards through
greater presence of native salaried managers or
outside directors. In fact, our findings show effects
to the contrary. This may be because the multi-
national firm at large and its representatives on the
board, often themselves professional managers,
may enjoy a greater power base and prestige as
possessors of more advanced managerial knowl-
edge relative to their local counterparts (Douma,
George and Kabir, 2006). Thus, the FBGs may
perceive the presence of these foreign managers as
professionalizing the governance of affiliate firms
that are operating as joint ventures, indeed
possibly as a more effective way to do so. It has
been claimed that partnering with foreign multi-
nationals helps to sustain family control (Bug˘ra,
1994). Our findings complement this claim by
showing that foreign firm involvement does not
lead to a greater role for salaried FBG managers
and outsiders in the governance of affiliate firms.
Our study has policy implications too. Institu-
tional reforms in ‘emerging economies’ are also
geared towards ‘modernizing’ corporate govern-
ance by making boards of enterprises more active
and professionalized. Our findings show that
regulatory interventions to this end do have
notable effects. They also demonstrate that effects
may vary with weaker and stronger institutional
impositions. Weaker institutional pressures of the
‘comply or explain’ kind on listed firms turned
out to be less influential relative to tighter
regulation through legal enforcement. The former
did have the overall effect of enlarging boards, but
not in a way that it was accompanied by a higher
ratio of salaried managers and ‘independent’
directors. That the relationship between both
public listing and tighter regulation and the
presence of non-affiliated outsiders was positive
but not statistically significant suggests perhaps
that there is also a rudimentary move in the
direction promoted by public authorities. Indeed,
overall, this study implies that for those pursuing
an agenda of reform in corporate governance, the
way forward, for the foreseeable future, may lie in
regulatory frameworks rather than claims based on
efficiency appeals or the influx of foreign direct
investment. Our findings also serve, however, as
yet another warning that there may be a gap
between institutional templates and the kind of
conformity that they generate (Davis and Marquis,
2005; Tsui-Auch and Lee, 2003).
Clearly, this study is limited by examining
FBGs in a single country. Although the Turkish
version of the FBG has been considered as
archetypal, it has its own history, bred, as it
was, in the context of a late-coming, state-led,
autarkic industrialization. Likewise, although
the post-1980 liberalization and internationaliza-
tion project has constituted one of the early
examples, it has been coupled with a slow
development of capital markets, backed up only
more recently by regulatory reforms pertaining to
corporate governance. Another limitation is that
our study has been cross-sectional and only
examined the more ‘elite’, as it were, among the
FBGs in the country, though it is those that
better approximate the generic form. However,
this also constrained the study with respect to
examining the effects of controlling family
characteristics such as generational differences
and family size as well variables like overall
business group size, diversification and age.
Indeed our analyses of variance results, as noted
above, pointed to significant FBG effects, imply-
ing that one or more of these variables may be
influencing the ways in which the boards of
affiliate firms are composed. A systematic assess-
ment of such effects, however, will require studies
in contexts where a larger number of business
groups exist that represent the generic organiza-
tional form examined in this study.
Our study is also limited by the small number
of variables that we could include to examine
each of the theoretical perspectives that we
considered, constrained as we were by the
availability of archival data. Considering addi-
tional contingency variables such as environmen-
tal turbulence, product diversification and prior
performance as well as the relative power of joint
venture partners may prove useful in future
research. An accompanying limitation is the
inevitably crude nature of some of the operatio-
nalizations, as we have had to employ categorical
rather than continuous measures in assessing
foreign operations, public ownership and joint
venture partnerships. Nevertheless, that we were
able to obtain significant results despite using
coarser variables lends further credence to our
findings, as these kinds of measures are likely to
yield more conservative estimates.
Despite these caveats, our study has shed some
further light on governance within this widespread
form of big business organization. Similar research
in other late-industrializing countries should help
to refine and expand its propositions and findings.
Most notable in this respect, perhaps, is to pursue
and re-examine the relative contribution of con-
tingency, institutionalist and power perspectives in
understanding and explaining governance systems.
Indeed, the usefulness of such a multi-theoretic
approach may well extend beyond ‘emerging
economies’ to study governance in the already
economically more advanced ones.
References
Anderson, R. C. and D. M. Reeb (2004). ‘Board composition:
balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms’, Administrative
Science Quarterly, 49, pp. 209–237.
Bug˘ra, A. (1994). State and Business in Modern Turkey: A
Comparative Study. New York: State University of New
York Press.
Carney, M. (1998). ‘A management capacity constraint?
Obstacles to the development of the Chinese family business’,
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 15, pp. 137–162.
Chandler, A. (1977). The Visible Hand: The Managerial
Revolution in American Business. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press.
Chang, S. J. (2003). ‘Ownership structure, expropriation and
performance of group affiliated companies in Korea’,
Academy of Management Journal, 46, pp. 238–254.
Chua, J. H., J. J. Chrisman and P. Sharma (1999). ‘Defining the
family business by behavior’, Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice, 23, pp. 19–39.
Cohen, J., P. Cohen, S. G. West and L. S. Aiken (2003). Applied
Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral
Sciences, 3rd edn. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Corbetta, G. and C. A. Salvato (2004). ‘The board of directors
in family firms: one size fits all’, Family Business Review, 17,
pp. 119–134.
Daily, C. M. and D. R. Dalton (1992). ‘The relationship
between governance structure and corporate performance in
entrepreneurial firms’, Journal of Business Venturing, 7, pp.
375–386.
Daily, C. M., D. R. Dalton and A. A. Cannela (2003).
‘Corporate governance: decades of dialogue and data’,
Academy of Management Review, 28, pp. 371–382.
Dalton, D. R., C. M. Daily, J. L. Johnson and A. E. Ellstrand
(1999). ‘Number of directors and financial performance: a
meta-analysis’, Academy of Management Journal, 42, pp.
674–686.
Davis, G. F. and C. Marquis (2005). ‘The globalization of stock
markets and convergence in corporate governance’. In
V. Nee and R. Swedberg (eds), The Economic Sociology of
Capitalism, pp. 352–390. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Douma, S., R. George and R. Kabir (2006). ‘Foreign and
domestic ownership, business groups and firm performance’,
Strategic Management Journal, 27, pp. 637–657.
Fiegener, M. K., B. M. Brown, D. R. Dreux and W. J. Dennis
(2000). ‘The adoption of outside boards by small private US
firms’, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 12, pp.
291–309.
Filatotchev, I., Y.-C. Lien and J. Piesse (2005). ‘Corporate
governance and performance in publicly listed, family-
controlled firms: evidence from Taiwan’, Asia Pacific Journal
of Management, 22, pp. 257–283.
Finkelstein, S. and D. Hambrick (1996). Strategic Leadership.
Top Executives and their Effects on Organizations. St Paul,
MN: West Publishing.
Gabrielsson, J. (2007). ‘Correlates of board empowerment in
small companies’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 31,
pp. 687–711.
Gedajlovic, E., M. H. Lubatkin and W. S. Schulze (2004).
‘Crossing the threshold from founder management to
professional management: a governance perspective’, Journal
of Management Studies, 41, pp. 899–912.
Go¨kSen, N. S. and B. U¨sdiken (2001). ‘Uniformity and diversity
in Turkish business groups: effects of scale and time
of founding’, British Journal of Management, 12, pp. 325–
349.
Granovetter, M. (2005). ‘Business groups and social organiza-
tion’. In N. J. Smelser and R. Swedberg (eds), The Handbook
of Economic Sociology, pp. 429–450. Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press.
Guille´n, M. F. (2000). ‘Business groups in emerging economies:
a resource-based view’, Academy of Management Journal, 43,
pp. 362–380.
Hoskisson, R. E., L. Eden, C. M. Lau and M. Wright (2000).
‘Strategy in emerging economies’, Academy of Management
Journal, 43, pp. 249–267.
Huse, M. (2000). ‘Boards of directors in SMEs: a review and
research agenda’, Entrepreneurship and Regional Develop-
ment, 12, pp. 271–290.
Jesover, F. and G. Kirkpatrick (2005). ‘The revised OECD
principles of corporate governance and their relevance
to non-OECD countries’, Corporate Governance, 13, pp.
127–136.
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu (2000). ‘Emerging market business
groups, foreign intermediaries, and corporate governance’. In
R. K. Morck (ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pp.
265–292. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Khanna, T. and J. W. Rivkin (2001). ‘Estimating the
performance effects of business groups in emerging markets’,
Strategic Management Journal, 22, pp. 45–74.
Khanna, T. and Y. Yafeh (2007). ‘Business groups in emerging
markets: paragons or parasites’, Journal of Economic
Literature, 45, pp. 331–372.
Kimberly, J. R. (1976). ‘Organizational size and the structur-
alist perspective: a review, critique and proposal’, Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly, 21, pp. 571–597.
Kock, C. J. and M. F. Guille´n (2001). ‘Strategy and structure in
developing countries: business groups as an evolutionary
response to opportunities for unrelated diversification’,
Industrial and Corporate Change, 10, pp. 77–113.
Kumar, S. and A. Seth (1998). ‘The design of coordination
and control mechanisms for managing joint venture–
parent relationships’, Strategic Management Journal, 19, pp.
579–599.
Lane, S., J. Astrachan, A. Keyt and K. McMillan (2006).
‘Guidelines for family business boards of directors’, Family
Business Review, 19, pp. 147–167.
Luo, X. and C. Chung (2005). ‘Keeping it all in the family: the
role of particularistic relationships in business group
performance during institutional transition’, Administrative
Science Quarterly, 50, pp. 404–439.
Luoma, P. and J. Goodstein (1999). ‘Stakeholders and
corporate boards: institutional influences on board composi-
tion and structure’, Academy of Management Journal, 42, pp.
553–563.
Lynall, M. D., B. R. Golden and A. J. Hillman (2003).
‘Board composition from adolescence to maturity: a multi-
theoretic view’, Academy of Management Review, 28, pp.
416–431.
Pearce, J. A. and S. A. Zahra (1992). ‘Board composition from
a strategic contingency perspective’, Journal of Management
Studies, 29, pp. 411–438.
Peng, M. W. (2004). ‘Outside directors and firm performance
during institutional transitions’, Strategic Management Jour-
nal, 25, pp. 453–471.
Peng, M. W., T. Buck and I. Filatotchev (2003). ‘Do outside
directors and new managers help improve firm performance:
An exploratory study in Russian privatization’, Journal of
World Business, 38, pp. 348–360.
Pennings, J. M. (1992). ‘Structural contingency theory: a reapp-
raisal’, Research in Organizational Behavior, 14, pp. 267–309.
Pfeffer, J. and G. R. Salancik (1978). The External Control of
Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. New
York: Harper and Row.
Sanders, W. G. and M. A. Carpenter (1998). ‘Internationaliza-
tion and firm governance: the roles of CEO compensation,
top team composition and board structure’, Academy of
Management Journal, 41, pp. 158–178.
Sullivan, D. (1994). ‘Measuring the degree of internationaliza-
tion of a firm’, Journal of International Business Studies, 25,
pp. 325–342.
Tsui-Auch, L. S. and Y.-J. Lee (2003). ‘The state matters:
management models of Singaporean Chinese and Korean
business groups’, Organization Studies, 24, pp. 507–534.
Ugur, M. and M. Ararat (2006). ‘Does macroeconomic
performance affect corporate governance? Evidence from
Turkey’, Corporate Governance, 14, pp. 325–348.
Voordeckers, W., A. V. Gils and J. V. den Heuvel (2007). ‘Board
composition in small and medium-sized family firms’, Journal
of Small Business Management, 45, pp. 137–156.
Whitley, R. (1990). ‘East Asian enterprise structures and the
comparative analysis of forms of business organization’,
Organization Studies, 11, pp. 47–74.
Whitley, R. (1999). Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structur-
ing and Change of Business Systems. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Yamak, S. and B. U¨sdiken (2006). ‘Economic liberalization and
the antecedents of top management teams: evidence from
Turkish ‘‘big’’ business’, British Journal of Management, 17,
pp. 177–194.
Yan, A. and B. Gray (2001). ‘Antecedents and effects of parent
control in international joint ventures’, Journal of Manage-
ment Studies, 38, pp. 393–416.
Yiu, D. W., Y. Lu, G. D. Bruton and R. E. Hoskisson (2007).
‘Business groups: an integrated model to focus future
research’, Journal of Management Studies, 44, pp. 1551–1579.
Young, M. N., M. W. Peng, D. Ahlstrom, G. D. Bruton and
Y. Jiang (2008). ‘Corporate governance in emerging econo-
mies: a review of the principal–principal perspective’, Journal
of Management Studies, 45, pp. 196–220.
Yurtoglu, B. B. (2000). ‘Ownership, control, and performance
of Turkish listed firms’, Empirica, 27, pp. 193–222.
Zahra, S. A. and I. Filatotchev (2004). ‘Governance of the
entrepreneurial threshold firm: a knowledge-based perspec-
tive’, Journal of Management Studies, 41, pp. 885–897.
Zahra, S. A. and J. A. Pearce (1989). ‘Boards of directors and
corporate financial performance: a review and integrative
model’, Journal of Management, 15, pp. 291–334.
